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A key postulate of traditional theories of motor skill-learning (e.g., Fitts and Posner, 1967;
Shiffrin and Schneider, 1977) is that expert performance is largely automatic in nature and
tends to deteriorate when the performer “reinvests” in, or attempts to exert conscious
control over, proceduralized movements (Masters and Maxwell, 2008). This postulate
is challenged, however, by recent empirical evidence (e.g., Nyberg, in press; Geeves
et al., 2014) which shows that conscious cognitive activity plays a key role in facilitating
further improvement amongst expert sports performers and musicians – people who
have already achieved elite status (Toner and Moran, in press). This evidence suggests
that expert performers in motor domains (e.g., sport, music) can strategically deploy
conscious attention to alternate between different modes of bodily awareness (reﬂective
and pre-reﬂective) during performance. Extrapolating from this phenomenon, the current
paper considers how a novel theoretical approach (adapted from Sutton et al., 2011) could
help researchers to elucidate some of the cognitive mechanisms mediating continuous
improvement amongst expert performers.
Keywords: expertise, continuous improvement, attention, embodiment, bodily awareness
Many traditional and contemporary theories of motor learning
emphasize the apparently “spontaneous” nature of skilled perfor-
mance. For example, Fitts and Posner (1967) and Shiffrin and
Schneider (1977) argued that skilful action runs “automatically”
or “procedurally.” Similarly, Dreyfus (2002) claimed that expert
performance proceeds “without calculating and comparing alter-
natives . . . what must be done, simply is done” (p. 372). Common
to these accounts of expertise is the belief that any form of con-
scious involvement during on-line skill execution is likely to prove
deleterious to movement and performance proﬁciency (Beilock
et al., 2002). Challenging these dominant perspectives on skill-
learning, however, is an emerging body of theory (e.g., Breivik,
2013; Toner and Moran, in press; Winter et al., 2014) and empiri-
cal evidence (seeNyberg, in press) which suggests that“continuous
improvement” (i.e., the phenomenon whereby certain skilled per-
formers appear to be capable of increasing their proﬁciency even
though they are already experts) at the elite level of sport is heavily
reliant upon the performer’s ability to move efﬁciently between
reﬂective and unreﬂective modes of bodily awareness. For exam-
ple, experts are often required to pay conscious attention to, or
“reinvest” in the training context, when their movements become
“attenuated” (see Collins et al., 1999) because they believe that in
order to optimize their performance they must “experiment with
and research theirmoving body”(Ravn andChristensen, in press).
Interestingly, evidence suggests that many skilled performers
remain“somaesthetically” aware (i.e., focusing on the propriocep-
tive “feel”, Shusterman, 2008) of their movement during on-line
skill execution (in the performance context; see Nyberg, in press)
and can use global or holistic cue words to improve performance
proﬁciency under pressurized conditions (see Mullen and Hardy,
2010). Therefore, instead of relying wholly on unthinking spon-
taneity to guide their performance, elite athletes appear to alternate
between differentmodes of cognitive processing, and also between
types of bodily self-awareness (i.e., reﬂective and pre-reﬂective)
in practice and performance contexts. Here athletes might adopt
what Colombetti (2011) refers to as a reﬂective awareness of their
bodily selves when they consider their intentions or actions and
assess whether they are appropriate to a certain situation. By con-
trast, pre-reﬂective awareness occurs when we are immersed in an
activity but our attention is not on our bodily selves. However,
in the latter case, Colombetti (2011) argues that the body is not
entirely invisible or absent from experience as it remains “as a
source of feeling, affect, agency and expressivity” (p. 27).
In a recent paper (see Toner and Moran, in press), we argued
that self-focused attention (including reﬂective bodily awareness)
plays an important role in allowing skilled athletes to reﬁne inef-
ﬁcient movements during deliberate practice. The present paper
extends this argument by postulating that skilled performers are
capable of strategically allocating attention, and hence alternat-
ing between reﬂective and pre-reﬂective modes of awareness, in
order tomeet the requirements of dynamically unfolding and con-
textually contingent performance environments. Furthermore, we
argue that inﬂuential theoretical accounts (such as self-focus theo-
ries; e.g., Beilock andCarr,2001) usedby researchers to identify the
cognitive mechanisms underpinning performance at the expert
levelmay be unable to adequately capture or explain the dynamical
(i.e., that it may be freely allocated) nature of attentional process-
ing amongst elite performers. Arising from these arguments, we
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propose that Sutton et al.’s (2011) “Applying intelligence to the
reﬂexes” (AIR) approach, and a number of methodologies which
aim to uncover participants’ phenomenological descriptions of
training and performance, may be better suited in achieving this
latter aim.
Over the last decade or so, experimental psychologists have used
standardized laboratory tasks in order to identify the attentional
processes that govern skilled movement and performance in sport
(e.g., Beilock and Carr, 2001; Jackson et al., 2006). For example,
Beilock et al. (2002) found that when skilled golfers attended to a
speciﬁc aspect of their putting technique (e.g., the exact moment
that the clubhead ﬁnished its follow-through), their performance
was impaired relative to counterparts in a dual-task condition
who putted while performing a secondary task (an auditory tone-
monitoring activity). Further evidence for the detrimental effects
of skill-focused attention on skilled performance have been found
in a baseball batting task (Gray, 2004); in soccer dribbling (Ford
et al., 2005); and in a golf putting task (Mullen and Hardy, 2000).
According to self-focus theories of attention (including Beilock
and Carr, 2001, “explicit monitoring hypothesis” and Masters,
1992, “conscious processing hypothesis”) attending to the step-
by-step component processes of a proceduralized skill results
in its control structures being broken down into a sequence of
smaller, separate, independent units. Ultimately, this creates the
opportunity for error that was not present in the “chunked” con-
trol structure (Beilock et al., 2002). Accordingly, performers have
been advised to avoid focusing on their bodily movement and,
instead, to “shift the focus to the external world, in particular on
the impact or effect of one’s behaviors” (Weiss and Reber, 2012,
p. 174).
At ﬁrst glance, it would seem that the case is quite clear – any
form of conscious processing that directs the performer’s atten-
tion to their bodily movement is likely to disrupt ﬂuent skill
execution. However, a closer look at the laboratory-based evi-
dence base would suggest that its ﬁndings must be interpreted
with caution. To explain, in each of the aforementioned stud-
ies athletes were asked to focus on a feature of their movement
which they may never have previously focused on (and hence
never practiced doing so). Indeed, few studies have sought to cap-
ture athletes’ attentional processes over time (e.g., between the
“off-season” and competitive season) or across different situations
(e.g., when recovering from injury). Given the dearth of stud-
ies in psychology on the temporal and/or contextual dynamics of
attentional processes, we question the degree to which available
evidence supports the received wisdom that conscious attention
will inevitably disrupt skilful performance. In fact, recent research
has begun to cast doubt upon the validity of this latter assumption.
For example, Nyberg (in press) found that elite freeskiers attended
to on-line skill execution in order to identify any features of their
movement which might require alteration/adjustment in order to
maintain performance proﬁciency. In addition, a large volume of
evidence indicates that elite performers are capable of ﬂexibly allo-
cating their attention (i.e., moving from reﬂective to pre-reﬂective
modes of bodily awareness) dependent upon the context-speciﬁc
demands confronting them during training and competitive per-
formance (see Bernier et al., 2011) or the challenges (e.g., injuries,
slumps) that they will inevitably face at some stage during their
careers (see Collins et al., 1999). In stark contrast to self-focus the-
ories, these emergent ﬁndings suggest that skilled performance is
likely to be impeded if the “proceduralization” of skills is excessive
(see Ericsson, 2006) – because experts must be able to deliber-
ately access and strategically re-route any semi-automated routines
in order to facilitate “continuous improvement” (Montero, 2010;
Breivik, 2013).
Against this background, we argue that there is ample empir-
ical evidence that “continuous improvement” at the elite level is
heavily dependent upon the performer’s ability to effectively uti-
lize reﬂective modes of bodily awareness. Skill-focused attention
(including conscious bodily awareness) appears to be a key feature
of skilled performance because athletes operating at this level are
driven by the desire to learn “new and better techniques” (Breivik,
2007, p. 127). For example, despite having won eight medals
at the Beijing Olympics, Michael Phelps decided to change his
freestyle technique in a bid to increase his sprinting speed (Ander-
sson, 2009). Moreover, athletes will inevitably experience injury,
fatigue, growth and aging which may disrupt habitual movement
(see Bissell, 2013; Eden, 2013) and require them to correct, relearn
and adjust their spontaneous performance (Shusterman, 2008).
In fact, research on the topic of “skill recovery” or “skill reﬁne-
ment” shows that skilled athletes who are attempting to regain
prior levels of performance often deliberately reinvest conscious
control to restore or reﬁne habitual movements in sports such
as javelin throwing and swimming (Hanin et al., 2004). In these
studies, researchers have helped athletes regain or reﬁne disrupted
movement patterns by encouraging them to become more con-
sciously aware of the somaesthetic differences between current
(problematic) and desired actions.
Somaesthetic awareness appears to play an important role in
“continuous improvement” by allowing performers to identify
movements that are causing them discomfort or outcomes which
are unusual or undesirable. Indeed, evidence suggests that these
forms of self- awareness are important mediators of “ﬂow” or
optimal competitive performance in sport. On the basis of their
pioneering research on ﬂow in sport, Jackson and Csikszentmi-
halyi (1999) argued that “without self-awareness an athlete misses
important cues that can lead to a positive change in performance”
(p. 105). According to these authors, self-awareness simply means
paying attention to cues provided by movements, and making
adjustments to your actions when something is amiss. Athletes
may use reﬂective bodily awareness to identify “attenuated” habits
in the performance context and subsequently adjust problematic
movements in the training context. However, evidence suggests
that performers may also choose to adjust problematic move-
ments during on-line execution during competition. To illustrate,
Collins et al. (2001) found that elite weightlifters chose to con-
sciously modify their movement during competition in order to
maintainmovement proﬁciency. Similarly,Nyberg found that elite
freeskiers learn how to discern (i.e., through “focal awareness”)
their rotational velocity to such an extent that they“knowwhether
they will be able to perform the trick the way it was intended
without adjustments, or whether they will need to make adjust-
ments during the ﬂight phase” (p. 7). In this study, elite free skiers
were video recorded during practice and subsequently interviewed
using a technique known as stimulated recall (SR – a method for
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enhancing reﬂection by recalling situations through audiotapes
or video recordings). Nyberg suggests that these performers rely
on their focal awareness (which is conscious and might include
knowledge of their velocity and how they need to modify it) and
their subsidiary awareness which is “less conscious” and includes
knowledge of the“particulars” such as the friction of the snow and
their feelings of previous jumps. These elite performerswere found
to navigate their focal awareness by rapidly shifting its target even
in the midst of the activity itself. For one performer, this meant
that he was focally and embodiedly aware of his rotational velocity
while in the air but could quickly change his awareness to take into
account environmental conditions such as his position in relation
to the targeted landing area. Clearly, these ﬁndings suggest that
some performers seek to counteract automaticity by ensuring that
certain features of performance are subject to strategic control.
Although some performers may choose to reinvest conscious
attention by adjustingmovement in the performance context, oth-
ers may choose to use cue words as “instructional nudges” (i.e.,
explicit verbal phrases ormaxims: see Sudnow,2001; Sutton,2007)
inorder to“re-route”embodied routines. According to Sutton et al.
(2011) cues may allow the performer to build and access “ﬂexible
links between knowing and doing” (p. 95). Cue words appear
to represent forms of thinking and remembering which can, in
some circumstances, allow performers to animate the kinesthetic
mechanisms of skilled performance. To illustrate, Jenkins (2007)
interviewed 113 European tour golfers and found that 70% of
these performers used at least one “swing thought” (i.e., a form of
cue word) during on-line skill execution. Clearly, certain forms of
mindedness or conscious processing are a common feature of elite
competitive performance.
The preceding evidencewould suggest that a better understand-
ing of the cognitive processes mediating continuous improvement
at the elite level of skilled performance can be achieved only
by adopting a theoretical framework which can account for the
dynamic nature of attentional processing. Therefore, instead
of explanations (e.g., self-focus theories) that emphasize the
proceduralized nature of skilled performance, wemay require the-
oretical accounts which focus on the interchanging phases or stages
of learning (Shusterman, 2008, 2009) that appear to characterize
training and performance at the elite level of sport. Consequently,
we propose that Sutton et al.’s (2011) AIR approach may help
researchers to explain how performers can alternate between dif-
ferent modes of processing. Brieﬂy, Sutton et al.’s (2011) model
is cyclical in the sense that the maintenance and enhancement of
performance efﬁciency requires the“rapid switching of modes and
styles” (2011, p. 93) within the training and performance context.
This framework proposes that expert skill relies on a mindedness
that“facilitates thedynamicﬂexibility of attention, allowing it to be
allocated freely and in a way that best meets contingent contextual
demands” (Geeves et al., 2014, p. 676). Accordingly, Geeves et al.
(2014) argue that expert performers may determine the amount
of attention they need to pay to certain processes in the practice
context (depending on their current level of performance) and
during on-line performance (according to the situational demands
presented to them).
Additionally, we propose that the AIR model may help
researchers to interpret the accumulating body of empirical
evidencewhich suggests that skilled performers seek to avoid auto-
maticity by ensuring that performance remains open to strategic
control in both the practice and performance context. Sutton
et al. (2011) argued that there are a number of different ways in
which embodied coping is minded or mindful (varying across
individuals, task domains, and cultures) and recommend that
we search for forms of theorizing that highlight these differ-
ences by exploring what actually happens to performers as they
“direct attention to kinesthetic cues in increasingly skilful ways”
(p. 96). Given the preceding evidence documenting the mind-
ful nature of expertise, it would also seem important to identify
methodological approaches that will help researchers capture
the attentional switching mechanisms that appear to underpin
“continuous improvement” at the elite level of sport. Speciﬁ-
cally, in order to understand embodied perspectives of experience
researchersmay wish to adoptmethodological approaches that are
“truly grounded in the carnal realities of the lived sporting bod-
ies” (Hockey and Allen-Collinson, 2007, p. 116). Some researchers
have recently taken up this challenge by drawing on participants’
phenomenological insights to better understand how embodied
expertise is shaped by training and performance. For example,
Ravn andChristensen (in press) utilized a phenomenology-related
analysis of qualitative data (including participant observations and
interviews) with an elite golfer to explore how the “described
experience comes into being rather than what this experience
means to the subject” (p. 5). The principal author observed
Line (an elite golfer), between 5 and 8 h each day, over 5 days
of training. The researchers drew on notes taken during these
observations to invite Line to describe her practice sessions and
experiences in detail. The researchers subsequently analyzed the
data by looking for “petite generalizations” (i.e., generalizations
that regularly occurred in the case study) relating to how Line
used her awareness of bodily sensations during training. Over-
all, the ﬁndings suggested that training at the elite level is not
just about handling the physicality of the body but also about
listening to it and regulating how it should “feel” in order to per-
form optimally (see Nyberg, in press, for a similar methodological
approach).
In another study, Bernier et al. (2011) used a naturalistic inves-
tigation to explore the attentional foci adopted by elite golfers in
training and performance contexts. The initial phase of the study
involved ﬁlming participants (for 60 min) in a training session
during the winter (non-competitive) season. The second phase
took place during the competitive season and involved ﬁlming
participants over the course of a complete round (i.e., 18 holes
of play) in a professional competition. Self-confrontation inter-
views, based on video footage, were conducted within 2 h of the
completion of the training session and competitive performance.
The interviews sought to encourage SR by asking each partici-
pant to view the videotape with the researcher and to recall and
describe what thoughts he was processing during the training ses-
sion or competition. Initially, the participants and the researcher
watched the ﬁrst situations on the video recording (i.e., the ﬁrst
training exercise and the ﬁrst three holes of the competition).
Having discussed the attentional foci adopted during these situa-
tions, the participant was asked to indicate speciﬁc circumstances
that he considered relevant to analyse. These situations included
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speciﬁc exercises during the training sessions or great/poorly exe-
cuted strokes during competition. Each sequence involved an
action (e.g., a practice drill or a shot), the preparatory phase
(e.g., the pre-shot routine), and the step following this action
(e.g., walking to the next shot). Participants were urged to express
their thoughts during each sequence, rather than being asked to
explain “their solution for the task or to provide a summary of
the general strategy adopted” (Bernier et al., 2011, p. 331). Induc-
tive content analysis revealed that these elite golfers adapted their
attentional focus depending on the context. That is, golfers were
found to ﬂexibly adjust their attentional focus (moving back-and-
forth between internal and external foci) across the preparatory,
execution and evaluative stages of training and competitive
performance.
In summary, a signiﬁcant volume of evidence shows that
skilled performers’ foci of attention may change dramatically over
the course of a competitive season (e.g., to deal with “attenu-
ated” movement patterns) or during a competitive event (i.e.,
between preparation, execution, and evaluation). Unfortunately,
as most studies of attentional processes in psychology are lim-
ited to static snapshots of the phenomena of interest, they shed
little light on the dynamical nature of attention. Against this
background, the current paper has argued how Sutton et al.’s
(2011)AIR approachmayprovide researcherswith amore detailed
understanding of the embodied nature of skilful action and
performance – thereby helping to explain how athletes strate-
gically allocate attentional resources in seeking to maintain and
enhance performance proﬁciency. In order to shed light on
the complex and dynamic attentional mechanisms that mediate
“continuous improvement” in expert performers researchers may
need to use a variety of methods including both standardized
laboratory techniques (e.g., occlusion paradigms, eye-tracking)
and phenomenological and naturalistic investigations (e.g., SR).
Together, these approaches may help researchers understand how
and why performers alternate between reﬂective and pre-reﬂective
modes of bodily awareness across training and performance
contexts.
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